Michaels Stores Still PINned beneath Payment Card Skimming Lawsuit

In May 2011, Michaels Stores reported that “skimmers” using modified PIN pad devices in eighty Michaels stores across twenty states had gained unauthorized access to customers’ debit and credit card information. Not a pretty picture for Michaels. Lawsuits soon splattered on the specialty arts and crafts retailer, alleging a gallery of claims under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), and for negligence, negligence per se, and breach of implied contract.

Late last month, U.S. District Court Judge Charles Kocoras ruled on Michaels’s motion to dismiss. Some claims were dismissed, but others survived. The opinion presents a broad-brush survey of potential data security breach claims, with some fine detail and local color particular to this variety of criminal data security breach.

PIN pads aren’t a communications service under the SCA.

In dispensing with those claims that plaintiffs “artfully tailor[ed]” to the language of the SCA, the court ruled that Michaels’ provision of PIN pads enabling consumers to pay by credit or debit card did not amount to the provision of “electronic communications services” or “remote computing services” as contemplated by the SCA. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to allege either that Michaels provided the underlying service that transported consumer credit and debit card data or that Michaels provided any off-site computer storage or processing services. Thus, the plaintiffs’ SCA claims failed.

Michaels didn’t deceive, but it may have been unfair.

The court next considered the plaintiffs’ claims under Illinois consumer law. The plaintiffs alleged that Michaels committed both a deceptive and an unfair trade practice by failing to take proper measures to secure access to PIN pad data.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ deception theory because the plaintiffs failed to identify any communication by Michaels that contained a deceptive misrepresentation or omission. But the court went the other way on plaintiffs’ unfair trade practice claim, in part because Michaels is alleged to have failed to implement PCI PIN Security Requirements that might have thwarted the skimmers.

Relying principally on the First Circuit’s decision in In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2009), but noting the potential relevance of the many decisions relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Judge Kocoras held that the plaintiffs’ assertion that Michaels’ failed to (a) implement industry standard data security safeguards and (b) promptly notify consumers of the resultant security breach sufficiently alleged a violation of the ICFA. (Without much analysis, the court allowed the latter to form the basis for an ICFA claim because “a disputed issue of fact exists” concerning both when Michaels first learned of the breach and whether Michaels permissibly notified individuals through substitute notice under the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act.) Specifically, the court explained that

Plaintiffs allege that the PCI PIN Security Requirements and the industry’s best practices obligated Michaels to implement procedures and practices to ensure that a legitimate device had not been substituted with a counterfeit device. Since Plaintiffs allege that the skimmers did, in fact, substitute legitimate devices with counterfeit devices, Plaintiffs’ allegations show that Michaels ignored its obligation to implement procedures and practices preventing the criminal conduct. Plaintiffs thus sufficiently allege that Michaels engaged in an unfair practice under the ICFA.

Although the court found that an unfair practice was sufficiently alleged, because ICFA claims require a showing of actual damages, the court went on to consider whether the harm plaintiffs claimed to have suffered (i.e., increased risk of identity theft, costs of credit monitoring and unauthorized charges on their accounts) supported their ICFA claims. Like other courts that have rejected similar claims, the court held that “Plaintiffs cannot rely on the increased risk of identity theft or the [voluntarily incurred] costs of credit monitoring to satisfy the ICFA’s injury requirement.” But the court nevertheless found that plaintiffs had adequately alleged a cognizable injury under the ICFA because they claimed that they lost money from unauthorized withdrawals and/or bank fees.

The economic loss rule bars the plaintiffs’ negligence claims.

As for the negligence and negligence per se claims, Michaels argued that these claims failed because the intervening acts of criminals severed the causal link between the retailer’s conduct and the plaintiffs’ injuries and because the economic loss rule barred the recovery of purely economic losses under a tort theory of negligence.

The court disagreed with Michaels as to the former theory because, in its view, Michaels’ failure to implement security measures that were specifically designed to minimize the risk to customer financial information created “a condition conducive to a foreseeable intervening criminal act.” As such, the skimmers’ reasonably foreseeable criminal actions did not sever the causal chain. Nevertheless, after considerable analysis, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligence and negligence per se claims because the plaintiffs failed to show why the economic loss rule should not apply to bar these claims.

Michaels may have breached an implied contract to protect customers from a security breach.

Lastly, relying on the First Circuit’s “persuasive” reasoning in Anderson v. Hannaford Bros., 2011 WL 5007175 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2011), see our Anderson blog post, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations “demonstrate the existence of an implicit contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and Michaels, which obligated Michaels to take reasonable measures to protect Plaintiffs’ financial information and notify Plaintiffs of a security breach within a reasonable amount of time.” Notably, the notification obligation the court cites is nowhere to be found in the Anderson decision. But this is perhaps unsurprising since the obligation to notify individuals of a data breach is now a creature of statute in almost every U.S. state presumably because it is not an implied term of a relationship involving the exchange of information.

What does it all mean?

There’s a lot to digest here. The ultimate disposition of the case is not yet clear given the early stage of the proceedings. What is clear is that you don’t need to get creative to keep an identity exposure case afloat beyond the motion to dismiss stage – you just need some damages. This won’t surprise anyone who has been following this issue.

The plaintiffs’ allegations that they lost money through unauthorized charges got them over a hurdle that other data security breach plaintiffs have stumbled on. Indeed, they forced the court to confront some of the thorny issues that prior breach cases avoided due to the lack of any cognizable harm. The courts approach suggests, as the FTC has suggested many times in its Section 5(a) cases, that if you’re not implementing reasonable information security measures – including those mandated by applicable industry standards – you may be painting yourself into a corner where you’ll become the target of a government investigation or even a private lawsuit.

Think skimming can’t happen to you? In November, Lucky Supermarkets announced that hackers used devices called “sniffers” to record credit card numbers belonging to customers and employees who used the self-checkout kiosks in 20 stores in California.

If you’re not ready to thwart skimmers, then perhaps you should be ready for a lawsuit.

Recent Death of Data Breach Class Action Resuscitates Lack of Standing Arguments in Identity Exposure Cases

On November 23, 2009, a federal court in Missouri bucked the recent trend in identity exposure lawsuits and refused to recognize Article III standing in a class action lawsuit that alleged simply an increased risk of identity theft resulting from a data breach. In Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that “plaintiff’s asserted claim of ‘increased-risk-of-harm’ fails to meet the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate harm that is ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he has standing to bring this suit.” Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action – which included claims for negligence, breach of contract, violations of state data breach notification laws and violations of Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act ("MPA”) – in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In doing so, the court breathed new life into the lack of standing argument that had begun to fall out of favor in identity exposure cases.

Prior to the Court’s decision in Amburgy, the trend in lost data cases had been in favor of finding subject matter jurisdiction, even where the plaintiff's allegations failed to state a valid cause of action. (See our post regarding McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc. here.) Indeed, as Judge Buckles observed in his opinion, subsequent to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, “district courts have consistently determined that claims of increased risk of identity theft resulting from security breaches sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing.” After noting the Seventh Circuit’s lack of discussion in Pisciotta about applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognized standards for determining standing under Article III, Judge Buckles engaged in a thorough analysis of the plaintiff’s standing to sue. Relying principally on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing because he “cannot show that he has suffered or will immediately suffer a concrete injury-in-fact.”

In addition to dismissing all of plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court explained that the claims for negligence, violations of state data breach notification laws and violations of Missouri’s MPA also should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to state a viable cause of action. The Court pointed out that Plaintiff’s breach of contract allegations stated a claim for at least nominal damages under Missouri law, but the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

California District Court Closes the Gap Left by Ruiz

On Monday, the Northern District of California granted Gap, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment in Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., et al., Case No. 07-5739 SC, holding that Ruiz's allegations of an increased risk of identity theft "do[] not rise to the level of appreciable harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law."

As many of our readers know, state data breach notification requirements have spawned a number of private lawsuits, including class actions. The vast majority of courts have found that the injury allegedly associated with the breach is too speculative and have refused to allow these cases to proceed. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 2007); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, Case No. 05-16990, 2007 WL 4116068 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007) (unpublished); Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365, 2008 WL 763177 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F.Supp.2d 705, 712-13 (S.D.Ohio 2007); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1021 (D.Minn. 2006); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, 444 F.Supp.2d 775, 783 (W.D.Mich.2006); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F.Supp.2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-668, 2006 WL 288483 (D.Minn. Feb.7, 2006) (unpublished); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485, 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (unpublished); Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, Civil No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006) (unpublished).

That is why many took notice when, last year, in Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2008), the Northern District of California granted the Gap’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings on three of five counts asserted by the plaintiff but allowed the plaintiff to proceed with a negligence claim and a statutory claim under state law. In last year's decision, the court found that an allegation of "increased risk of identity theft" from a lost Social Security number was sufficient "injury in fact" to establish standing and survive a motion to dismiss the negligence claim.

In Ruiz, a thief gained entry to the Chicago offices of Gap's job application processing vendor, Vangent, and stole two laptops. At the time of the theft, one of the computers was downloading information about Gap job applicants. The laptop in question contained personal information, including Social Security numbers, of approximately 750,000 Gap job applicants. Gap sent a notification letter to the applicants whose personal information was on the computer 11 days following the theft. Gap offered to provide the applicants with 12 months of credit monitoring with fraud assistance at no cost. Gap also advised job applicants to notify their banks and sign up for a free credit report from one of the three major credit reporting agencies. Ruiz did not enroll for the credit monitoring and did not contact his bank; he did attempt to sign up for a free credit report.

Noting that an essential element of a negligence claim under California law is "appreciable, nonspeculative, present harm", the court found that an increased risk of identity theft "does not rise to the level of . . . harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law" (emphasis added). In fact, Ruiz testified that he has never been a victim of identity theft. The court also rejected Ruiz's reliance on medical monitoring cases, expressing doubt that a California court "would view these two types of cases as analogous" given that there is no public health interest at stake in lost-data cases and noting that toxic exposure plaintiffs seeking to recover the costs of future medical monitoring face significant evidentiary burdens. "Ruiz presents no evidence showing there was an actual exposure of his personal information, much less that it was significant and extensive."

Thus, the Northern District of California joins the many other courts that have rejected negligence claims arising from lost data cases in the absence of a showing of actual harm.