New Jersey's High Court Ruling Reaffirms Employer's Right To Monitor and Restrict Computer Use

In a continuation of the Stengart v. Loving Care Agency case we wrote about here, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on March 30, 2010 that emails sent by an employee from a company laptop via a web-based email account (Yahoo!) to her attorney were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also ruled and provided insight on a far broader and more practical issue for employers -- namely, how to draft enforceable computer usage policies and/or make existing policies more effective.

Click here for more about this momentous decision and some practical tips about drafting sustainable computer usage policies from Proskauer’s Labor & Employment attorneys who submitted a “friend of the court” brief in the case on behalf of Employers Association of New Jersey.

Why All the Fuss about Reading an Employee's Emails?

Lately we've been writing a lot about employers, and their ability to read their employees' e-mails. From New Jersey, to Idaho, to France, this is a hot topic and we are following new developments in this area closely. To read Proskauer partner Katharine Parker's take on the issues, please take a look at her comments to the Wall Street Journal, published on November 19, 2009.

French Employers Can Open Files Located on a Company-Issued Computer Provided That They Are Not Clearly Identified As Personal

By a decision of October 21, 2009 (n°07-43877), the French Supreme Court ruled that files created by an employee on a computer issued by his employer for work purposes were presumed professional unless the employee identified them clearly as personal. This being said, the Court concluded that the employer was entitled to open these files in the employee’s absence and without having informed the employee in advance.

In this case, the employee was suspected by his employer to have competed unfairly with the employer’s business. To investigate these suspicions, the employer requested a bailiff to seek evidence from the employee’s work computer. In order to prevent the employee from erasing the evidence, the employer did not alert the employee that his work computer would be examined.

During his examination of the computer, the bailiff noticed that the computer contained a folder titled with the employee’s initials and, within it, two sub-files, one titled “personal,” the other titled with the name of the employer’s competitor. The bailiff only opened the second sub-file, titled with the name of the competitor, where he found evidence that the employee had engaged in unfair competition against the employer.

Supported by an affidavit of the bailiff, the employee was terminated for gross fault, i.e., without any indemnity. Thereafter, the employee initiated a lawsuit against the employer for violation of his privacy.

The Court of appeals found that the bailiff should not have opened the folder titled with the employee’s initials without first informing the employee or without the employee being present.

Until this case, the case law was unclear on whether folders or files located on an employee’s work computer but titled with the employee’s name or initials would be afforded privacy protection under workplace privacy laws. However in this ruling, the French Supreme Court made clear that all files created by an employee on an employer’s computer belong to the employer unless they are expressly identified as personal. By adopting this position, the French Supreme Court was consistent with the French Data Protection Agency (CNIL) which, since 2002, has advised that employees should be cautious when using their work computers for personal purposes.

This decision is most helpful in that it clearly informed French companies of the privacy rules that apply to folders and files that employees store on their work computers. If the employee has clearly identified the files as personal, the employer has no choice but to either obtain the employee’s prior consent before opening the files, or to go before a Court to get a Court injunction allowing the employer to open the files.

The Sixth Circuit Affirms Individual Expectation of Privacy in Emails

In a decision that will significantly impact the ability of the government to access electronic communications, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on June 18, 2007, affirmed a district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting governmental entities from obtaining Internet Service Providers’ (“ISP”) subscribers’ e-mail communications unless the subscriber first receives prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court found unconstitutional the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provisions allowing Government seizure of such communications without prior subscriber notice, because the court order could be issued without a showing of probable cause that the subscriber had committed a crime. The Sixth Circuit found that individuals have an expectation of privacy regarding the contents of emails sent or stored through an Internet Service Provider (ISP).

The SCA, passed in 1986 as an amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, contains various provisions regarding “stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records” impacting ISPs’ subscribers’ records and communications. The specific provisions of the SCA at issue in Warshak were sections 2703(b) and (d) and 2705(a). Sections 2703(b) and 2705(a), in pertinent part, allow a governmental entity to obtain the contents of electronic communications that have been stored by an ISP for more than 180 days without notice to the subscriber if obtained by a warrant (which is subject to the usual probable cause standard) and with delayed notice to the subscriber if the governmental entity obtains a court order and the court finds there may be an adverse result from providing notice. Section 2703(d) allows the issuance of court orders when the government has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the communications are pertinent to an active criminal investigation, a less rigorous standard then probable cause. 

In Warshak, the U.S. Government directed its order to Plaintiff Steven Warshak’s ISPs to obtain, among other things, his stored e-mail communications in support of its criminal investigation of wire and mail fraud. The Government did not seek e-mails in electronic storage less than 180 days old (which can only be obtained with a warrant). The court order approved delayed notice. After the Government provided the delayed notice, Warshak filed a complaint seeking a preliminary injunction and alleging that the disclosure of his emails without a warrant or notice violated the Fourth Amendment and the SCA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that individuals sending emails have an expectation of privacy, and preliminarily enjoined the seizure of emails from an ISP account when an account holder was not given notice and a hearing. The government appealed the district court’s decision.  

On appeal, the Government argued that an SCA court order is akin to a subpoena and therefore  probable cause is unnecessary. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that, for a subpoena to issue, the Government must meet only the lower “reasonableness standard.” However, in reviewing the case law, the court concluded that individuals may challenge a third party subpoena before disclosure is compelled if they have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” regarding the records at issue. The Warshak court therefore reasoned that, where an email user has an expectation of privacy regarding the email content, the government must meet the more rigorous “probable cause” standard. The court found an expectation of privacy in e-mail communications by analogizing the emails to the surveillance of telephone conversations at issue in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the government interception of telephone conversations was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the conversations.   

The Sixth Circuit made only one modification to the district court’s injunction, adding that, “if the government can show, based on specific facts, that an e-mail account holder has waived his expectation of privacy via-a-vis the ISP, compelled disclosure of e-mails through notice to the ISP alone would be appropriate.” The Court explained such a waiver requires more than the ISP having some level of monitoring policies in place. For example, an ISP’s terms of use reserving a right of access to e-mail communications for specific, limited purposes or its use of technological monitoring of e-mails to identify child pornography, would not constitute a waiver by the subscriber. Rather, for a subscriber to waive his expectation of privacy in e-mail communications, the ISP would have to have clear terms of service apparent to the user allowing it to regularly audit, inspect, or monitor subscriber e-mails. The Court analogized the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Heckenkamp, Nos. 05-10322, 10323, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7806 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007), where a student who connected his computer to the university’s network was held to have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding his computer files because the university’s monitoring policy was limited in scope. See our discussion of Heckenkamp here. The Court distinguished workplace privacy where an employer explicitly notifies employees of its right to monitor and access e-mail.              

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not effect other provisions of the SCA, including the government’s ability to obtain, without notice, e-mail communications with a warrant and subscriber account information with a warrant, court order or subpoena.