On June 25, 2010, Judge Richard Berman of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. in Hammond v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., dismissing in its entirety a putative class action lawsuit arising from the loss of backup tapes containing personal information in the spring of 2008. Judge Berman’s dismissal represents yet another in a long, and still growing, line of cases standing for the proposition that without more, the mere exposure of personal information is not an adequate basis for a lawsuit.

On May 28, 2010, in an unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the California district court’s dismissal of a class action lawsuit against retailer Gap, Inc. because, among other things, the plaintiff failed to show that the loss of his personal information harmed him in a legally cognizable way. The Ninth Circuit’s decision echoes those issued in every “identity exposure” lawsuit to date: an increased risk of identity theft does not a lawsuit make!

On January 5, 2010, Judge William Hibbler of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois became the latest federal district judge to share his views about whether an increased risk of future harm based on the inadvertent exposure of personal information is a legally cognizable harm. In Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Insurance Co., No. 1:09-cv-2286 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010), Judge Hibbler . . . hinted that the plaintiff’s claims for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Illinois Insurance Information and Privacy Act, as well as his common law claims of invasion of privacy, negligence and breach of implied contract, may ultimately be dismissed if the plaintiff failed to show a basis for damages other than his alleged increased risk of future harm, such as identity theft.

In Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that “plaintiff’s asserted claim of ‘increased-risk-of-harm’ fails to meet the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate harm that is ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he has standing to bring this suit.”

Where the only harm alleged is mere “speculation as to a possible risk of injury,” a claim cannot survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, according to a District of Connecticut decision issued on August 31, 2009. McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., and Bank of New York Mellon, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944-VLB (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009), thus follows a long and growing line of cases which simply hold that where there is no actual harm, there can be no case.

Where the only “damages” alleged following a data security breach are the costs of credit monitoring, a plaintiff has no case, so ruled the Seventh Circuit on August 23, 2007. The decision dealt another blow to so-called “identity exposure” plaintiffs seeking to recover damages stemming from the unauthorized disclosure of their personal information, as the Seventh Circuit’s ruling joined the unanimous line of lower court decisions denying recovery in the absence of actual, present harm.

In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, — F.3d –, 2007 WL 2389770 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007), the court ruled that “Indiana law would not recognize the costs of credit monitoring that the plaintiffs seek to recover in this case as compensable damages.” Id. at *6. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit joins a chorus of federal district courts that uniformly reject such costs as a form of cognizable injury sufficient to support legal claims for damages.