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On Friday, the Article 29 Working Party issued official guidance relating to the General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR (which we’ve covered in previous posts here and here). The Article 29 Working Party is comprised of representatives of the various EU Member States’ data protection authorities (DPAs), so this marks the first time that the DPAs have revealed their thoughts on how they plan to interpret and enforce specific GDPR provisions.  This is welcome news for companies that, until this point, have been left to figure out compliance strategies without any indication as to how some of the newer concepts the GDPR introduces will operate in practice when the Regulation begins to apply in 2018.

On October 19, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that dynamic IP addresses may qualify as “personal data” under EU privacy law. As we covered here on the blog a few months ago, this decision is significant because it clarifies that companies that collect, store, process, and/or transfer dynamic IP addresses belonging to EU users may have to treat them in accordance with the stringent restrictions that EU law imposes on the handling of personal data. As a refresher, an IP (short for “Internet protocol”) address is a series of numbers allocated to a specific device that identifies a device and allows it to access an electronic communications network, such as the Internet.  IP addresses can be either “dynamic” or “static”; dynamic IP addresses, which are more common, change every time the device connects to the Internet, while static IP addresses remain constant and do not change every time the device re-connects.

The Privacy Shield is now live, having gone into effect on August 1. Perhaps emboldened by the Article 29 Working Party’s late July announcement that European regulators will not challenge the program’s adequacy for at least a year (after the first annual review of the program in May 2017), companies have begun self-certifying in order to legalize their transfers of personal data from the EU to the US. However, as we reported previously, the Privacy Shield nevertheless faces a somewhat precarious future, as it is likely that it will face multiple legal challenges.

Yesterday, the European Commission adopted the EU-US Privacy Shield, a framework designed to replace the invalidated Safe Harbor program. In theory, the Privacy Shield offers its adherents a relatively simple, straightforward way to legally transfer personal data from the EU to the US.  In reality, however, the Privacy Shield is likely to face legal challenges that may hinder its ability to serve as a reliable means of legal transfer, at least for the immediate future.  

As a result of Thursday’s historic referendum, the United Kingdom will be leaving the EU. The decision will have a profound effect on many areas, including the global economy, trade, immigration and, potentially, the continued unity of the UK.  The United Kingdom won’t be departing immediately, though – it must invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and then negotiate its withdrawal with the European Council, a process that may take as long as two years once Article 50 is invoked. Multinationals and companies that are thinking about establishing a presence in the UK and/or EU will be watching those negotiations closely in order to determine how the UK’s change in status will affect business going forward.

Last month, one of the Advocate Generals (“AG”) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona, issued an opinion suggesting that dynamic IP addresses should be recognized as “personal data” under EU law. If the CJEU adopts this reasoning, it would represent a landmark decision that would resolve a contentious issue that has been plaguing EU data protection law for years.  This post delves into the AG’s decision and its potential consequences.

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ruling that a plaintiff must sufficiently allege an injury that is both concrete and particularized in order to have Article III standing, and further that a “bare procedural violation” of a plaintiff’s statutory right may not be